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CAN WE THINK OF SALVATION AS 
A RETURN TO MENTAL HEALTH? 
Frederick Sontag 
A. The Modern Hope to Replace Salvation With a New Science 
When we think of "mental health," we have not recently connected this to the 
notion of "salvation" in Christian doctrine. There once was a time, of course, 
when many who wanted to recover or restore mental health turned to Christianity 
and found their healing. There are, I suppose, many reasons which can be given 
for why this ceased to be true, but at least one of these involves the rise of 
psychiatry as a profession and the well-known anti-religious sentiments of its 
pioneers, most notably Sigmund Freud. Psychiatry arose as the modern and 
"scientific" alternative to the healing and counseling practices of Christianity. 
Thus, before we can decide whether "salvation" can be seen as a road to mental 
health today, we must go back and consider how psychiatry came to replace it. 
Ernest Becker is a good guide to assist us in this reappraisal. He is a champion 
of the scientific status of the social sciences, and he believes in their ability to 
revolutionize the study of man. He has written about the role psychiatry played 
in this central venture of the modern age, 1 and he, an astute critic of the program 
of psychiatry. At the same time he is a supporter of its claim to supplant traditional 
religion. As the subtitle of his book indicates ("The New Understanding of 
Man"), the issue revolves around whether a superior and perhaps scientific 
knowledge of man became available which outdates all previous religious prop-
osals for the healing of man. Should all "mental illness" now be defined to come 
under the general category of "the science of man"? If so, it no longer falls 
within the province of religion. 
Briefly put, Becker's book massively documents the failure of the social 
sciences to achieve their proposed revolution in the understanding of man such 
that it becomes another area of science. He traces the reason for this failure to 
the founding assumptions of the social sciences. Still, he remains optimistic that 
all we need to complete the proposed revolution is a reordering of those original 
assumptions. As Becker sees it, the chief problem is that "disciplinary prolifer-
ation" has had the effect of burying man. Thus, the social sciences have failed 
to give us the clear, whole perspective on man we need in order to cure our ills. 
To accomplish this Becker proposes a "radical recentering of the human sciences" 
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which would take man's self-value ;is "the proper invariant point of reference 
around which the various disciplines should revolve their efforts."2 In other 
words, Becker thinks that our failure does not lie in the original assumption 
which launched the social sciences but in a methodological problem. Having 
failed to date, we can still proceed to build "a mature hypothetico-deductive 
science," (p. x) or so Becker is convinced. 
Of course, others have proposed that we adopt this "man-centered" orientation. 
What is new in Becker's proposal is that he believes we now have enough 
knowledge to forge a broadly inclusive and logically consistent science of man. 
Becker admits that we have lived through an era of "disciplinary morass." 
Nevertheless, for reasons which are not quite clear, he still thinks it is possible 
to transform this into a "compelling rational basis for moral action" (p. x). Most 
of the social sciences began with a crusading goal of this kind. They wanted to 
improve the lot of mankind, but their zeal was lost somewhere along the way 
as disciplinary cross-fire developed between them. The goal Becker sets out for 
us is to overthrow the "narrow medical view of human ills" (p. 2). Psychology, 
he thinks, must merge into a broad human science. "Mental illness" is cultural 
behavior, not a narrow medical phenomenon. 
Part of Becker's rejection of the role of traditional religion in mental health 
stems from his conviction that the Enlightenment has come, making all things 
new. "Man has on the whole become more sophisticated and rational," (p. 59) 
he asserts. If this is true, new techniques are demanded and old ones are automat-
ically outmoded. Becker admits "man's need to forgive himself each night, to 
absolve himself so that he can begin again, anew" (p. 70). This, of course, is 
the classical religious notion of confession and forgiveness, but still Becker feels 
that today "religious motives have little to do with life as most people live it" 
(Ibid). Thus, religion can be of no assistance in performing this needed task. 
The appearance of schizophrenia "sums up man's coming of age in society" (p. 
108). In other words, rather than decreasing psychic illness, evolutionary advance 
increases it as man sheds his need of religion. 
Action breaks down when the individual's sense of self-value is undermined. 
In a secular world we must create a symbolic worth on our own. When human 
action bogs down, meaning dies. "When the individual does not control meanings 
symbolically, we call him 'mentally ill'" (p. 120). Although we have been at 
odds about all of this for 50 years, Becker for some reason thought (in 1964) 
that happily "the data of the human sciences are starting to emerge; their relation-
ships are becoming clear" (p. 132). Whether or not his optimism is soundly 
based is a crucial matter. If the day of religious help is past and if being alone 
in the modern world actually increases mental illness, all is lost, that is, unless 
we think all the social sciences are about to reach a level of agreement so that 
they can step in and provide the needed solution. Cultural advance gave us this 
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problem in the first place, according to Becker. "As soon as the theological 
world view was undermined, man was doomed to examine his miserable condi-
tion" (p. 138). 
This is a neat reversal of the usual charge that religion needlessly places 
mankind under a burden of guilt from which the modem age, at last, can release 
us. "Man has rolled up his shirt sleeves, eager to tamper with his own creation" 
(p. 139), but the result is to make us less secure rather than more. On the positive 
side, Becker is convinced that we are near to developing an ineluctable law for 
human development. If true, this would help us reverse the tide and restore our 
lost mental health. For this now to be possible depends on his theory that human 
motivation owes almost nothing to primary biological drives. Thus, if man is 
self-created via his culture, the animal side counts for less. If all our conduct 
has been learned, it can all be unlearned, and we have a very plastic creature 
on our hands which we can remold, that is, if an agreed law of human development 
is now in our possession as Becker thinks. We no longer find it possible to give 
a purely physical interpretation of man, but in spite of the important role given 
to symbolism, Becker thinks it is possible to found a precise science of man. 
He thinks that, at last, the final theory of man is here which can provide our 
salvation. But in response, we must ask Becker: In rejecting the doctrinal rigidity 
of Freud, have we not also done away with the possibility of finality? If so, then 
are we in such an assured position to cure the mental illness which he attributes 
to our loss of the theological world? Becker claims to see the human personality 
from the inside, and it holds no more mysteries. Since the culture we create is 
a fiction, he thinks, "the kind of people we make depends upon the kind of 
people we want" (p. 167). Unlike the notion of original sin, our restrictions have 
been caused by artificial restraints over which we can now assume control. 
Becker feels that we no longer need to struggle against ourselves, against forces 
deep within our nature. Rather, our only opponent is a world we ourselves have 
fashioned during our early training. 
The anxiety we now face arose from the possibility of abrogating an entire 
framework of meaning. But at the same time this happened, our world lost its 
mystery . We lost a world, but on the other hand we now know how to build a 
new one. Neurosis grows due to a failure to symbolize and also by a constriction 
of choice possibilities. Anxiety arises due to a lack of words that symbolize. If 
so, this matter is now subject to our control. However, the issue we must face 
is: Do we really create our world? It would be much easier for us to solve our 
psychic problems if this were true; Becker is right about that. He thinks we 
know where to pin the blame for human failure: on the flimsy symbolic basis 
for human meaning we ourselves constructed. If this is the case, "there is very 
little about the peculiar human condition that is not somehow in man's potential 
control" (p. 183). Guilt and shame, though typically human, have been made 
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by man and so may be unmade by us. Yet the issue remains: Do we really create 
our world at will? If we do create it, of course, we can change it. But can we 
really do that? 
Modem man, in his quest for automony, is forcing culture's hand because, 
Becker is convinced, we are about to gain control over man by learning how to 
construct culture. All we need to do is to liberate ourselves from the fetters of 
the excessive restraints of our early environment. This formula sounds easy 
enough, but is it working today? Becker simply assumes that man has full control 
over the means to construct culture, but can we agree to that? He defines "the 
world" as rational and as self-constructed; therefore it can be reconstructed. 
"Mental illness" becomes simply our failure to practice "a fully rational approach 
to interpersonal living" (p. 206), which Becker assumes we have now learned 
how to do at will. He adopts a traditional Enlightenment view: It is "ignorance" 
that accounts for the seemingly irrational behavior of the mentally ill. Thus, our 
illnesses can be cured by the new knowledge which has recently come into our 
possession. 
Medical psychiatry, of course, can no longer be in charge of the revision of 
man, since accomplishing this change depends on developing a symbolic view 
of man and the world. Becker's account makes mental illness easy. Therefore, 
it can be cured easily, since it only depends on unstructuring and restructuring 
our world views. Schizophrenia is a stupidity. The victim lacks behavior patterns 
to manipulate means and ends. Thus, the "normal" individual is now defined as 
the creative one, "the one who exercised control over his choice of means and 
ends" (p. 209). The history of modem psychology, thus becomes a history of 
its own disillusionment as a science. "Psychology has evolved back into 
philosophy," he thinks (p. 120). 
However, since Becker does not seem aware of his own assumptions (that is, 
his whole theory seems obvious to him), he has turned psychology into a social 
philosophy. He thinks we can now stamp out mental illness by putting the control 
of means and ends sequences back into the hands of the people who need to 
make the choices. It is just that simple. As he has defined it, we now are faced 
with the opportunity to control the social world (p. 125). Becker makes this 
assertion in response to his inquiry into psychoanalysis. We can wrest control 
of the tools of mental health from religion, but only if we establish a new science 
which can exercise this kind of power, he thinks. But, if Becker is wrong, as I 
believe he is, and the modem world has failed in this effort, Christianity with 
its less precise doctrines is not in such an unfavorable position. 
However, this change in man's mental health, which Becker is so sure the 
social sciences can induce, requires all individuals to change together. Since the 
criticism of religion is centered on its piecemeal approach and its lack of ability 
to change whole cultures, the new social science approach must be based on 
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mass change. If it is not, we are back to the village priest counseling his 
parishioner. Psychiatric problems represent human failures, because they indicate 
a lack of human control in situations where choice is called for. Since this is 
thought to depend on an ignorance of the possibilities present in an ordered 
world, once we realize this, mass change will come by maximizing individual 
choice, or so Becker postulates. 
However, if it is the individual who controls his own choice rather than some 
"science," you have to be sure the individual will always seek change as he or 
she is supposed to. Maximizing choice may be the only way to meet the challenge 
of twentieth century society, but Becker treats it as a matter of "available vocab-
ularies of motivation" over which the individual lacks free control. The "real 
problem" is the one of "individual integration" (p. 128), he says. But isn't Becker 
operating under an illusion: That if only we do a little something new in education, 
each individual will suddenly take over the task of creating himself and all will 
be fine. There are powerful interests who wish to curb human spontaneity, such 
as Marxism. Becker can only carry out his analysis by assuming that what he 
says is true of every man everywhere, not just of some. Becker says: "We seem 
to be calling for nothing less than a total reenlistment of society in the furtherance 
of human design" (p. 225). 
At this point what we must ask Becker is: Will altering culture through education 
really produce free individuals, each one capable of handling decisions, or will 
this procedure merely inculcate another type of conformity? Becker thinks he 
has "a total problem" (p. 228). He has the power, via the new science, to program 
for a full exercise of human freedom. "The twentieth century is witnessing a 
revolution in self-awareness that has not been seen since the Renaissance and 
the time of the Greeks," Becker asserts expansively (Ibid.). But we need to 
assess this claim carefully to see if his thesis really can produce the mental health 
Becker desires. Like so many others, Becker gives aesthetic experience a particu-
larly heavy role. It takes the place of religion and God in its healing potential: 
"The aesthetic object shows that the perfect union of ends and means is possible. 
It embodies ... the vision that fulfillment is possible" (p. 233). Art takes on the 
same function as the Marxist goal of the classless society or the Christian heaven. 
Religious ritual, long used as an avenue to restore psychic balance, is dismissed. 
Aesthetic ritual takes its place. "This is the function of ritual, to interweave 
inextricably the symbolic and the organic, by gesture and sound, body balance, 
measured movements" (p. 237). That is the modern avenue to mental health. 
But if we ask why art is expected to do so much for us now, we have to reply: 
Because religion isn't doing it. "The aesthetic object demonstrates that life is 
not in vain, by holding up tangible proof of human creativity" (p. 239). Art 
provides the meaning to life which religion formerly did, and Becker never 
denies that our mental health demands this kind of guarantee of human signifi-
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cance. Just as religion used to transcend the world, so Becker thinks aesthetics 
now takes man beyond the confines of culture. Human values become supreme. 
In a pre-scientific day religion stressed the healing power of love, and now 
Becker ties love to aesthetics. He sounds like Paul's letter to the Corinthians 
when he says: "Thus love banishes shame, transcends the fictitious learning, the 
sham morality" (p. 241). The primary aim of psychotherapy is accomplished by 
love, he feels. "The individual accepts his past and his uniqueness as irrevocable, 
as necessarily and desirably so" (p. 240). Since the love object functions as the 
psychotherapist, we have here the counterpart of the religious claim that "Jesus 
accepts you" or "God loves you." But our question must be: Is this true for most 
cases? Is he treating love as a romantic ideal rather than as it exists in fact? Love 
may mirror the religious experience of release that men so long found healing, 
but can love and aesthetics accomplish this alone? Perception and contemplation 
of the unique, existential, loved-object has taken the place of the mass, confession, 
and forgiveness. 
Becker wants the loved object to function as the psychotherapist, or perhaps 
we should say, as the priest. Jesus accepts you; God loves you, and the prime 
religious experience is that of release. But can art and a love object do this as 
well? Becker has set humankind up in a situation which does not eliminate our 
religious needs but rather takes them as a part of human nature, but then he 
proposes that these same functions be shifted to non-religious offices. Becker 
ties love to beauty so that art becomes involved in overcoming the split between 
self and world. The loved object somehow adds the meaning life needs in order 
to go beyond being a simple natural process. Love now has the power to forgive 
which people .formerly sought in God. Of course, what must be noted again is 
that this assertion depends on a very idealized notion of "love." In ordinary 
circumstances love is as much the source of our bondage as of our release. 
Recognizing that our situation at the present time is not quite like the picture 
he paints, Becker puts a great deal of stress on the changes education can bring 
about in the future. But if the future is to be different from the past, what will 
provide this change? Becker places his hope on education. He wrote Revolution 
in Psychiatry in 1964, but what has happened to education in the meantime? 
Rather than agreeing on a new educational program and then implementing it, 
we are in even greater disagreement about our educational programs, and many 
think the whole system is faltering. Rather than freeing us, education itself has 
become a prime source of controversy. We are surely further from an agreed 
educational agenda than when Becker wrote. If so, does that give us much 
optimism about the likelihood of accomplishing this revolution via education 
and thus providing a substitute religion? Becker has defined us into a religious 
situation of need, but has he left us any way to satisfy this short of a return to 
tradition? 
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In a later book (1969) Becker again stresses his aim to "educate, elevate, and 
free man" (p. vii).3 The problem with this, of course, is that such a change must 
be achieved universally, not just accomplished by an elite education for a few. 
Traditional religion was criticized because it offered release but only to its devoted 
followers. The aim of the modem world was to universalize this and to open 
release to all mankind. Becker pinned his hope for the realization of this goal 
on a new understanding of man and on an educational program which is scien-
tifically based, just as Marx pinned his hope on an economic theory and social 
revolution. But the hoped for universal agreement on a new theory of human 
nature has not materialized; all the while our trust in education to release us has 
been disappointed time and time again. 
We need, says Becker, "a rich and meaningful world" to which we can be 
committed (p. 10). But even if this is the case, the issue is: Can we create the 
process ourselves and keep it under our own control? To put it simply, Becker 
offers us a new alternative to the Christian offer of salvation. His is based on 
the same perception of needs, but he removes the power from God's hands and 
places it in man's. Our problem would be quite different if Becker did not agree 
that all men and women still do need release, forgiveness, and restoration. Like 
Camus' The Fall, he has placed us in a situation of religious need but offers a 
secular solution. We must assess the basis of Becker's optimism and decide 
whether something so new has been added that it enables us to be optimistic 
about self-rescue now when we could not be before. There is no question but 
that psychiatry deals effectively with some special cases, but can it cure "the 
human predicament"? 
The proposed program of the social sciences and modem psychiatry has been 
around long enough so that, even if we do not pronounce it a total failure (which 
would be too harsh), we can say that it has not had the universal releasing effect 
its enthusiasts hoped for (which is also true of Marxism). In some eyes, the rise 
of modem science made religion'S promise of cure obsolete, but Becker's reap-
praisal actually makes religion a viable option once again. If a final secular cure 
has not appeared as the modem alternative we hoped for, no alternate source of 
mental health can be ruled out as antiquated. If we reject the long-assumed 
notion of an absolute line of progress, we are obligated to reinvestigate all cures, 
religious and otherwise, which offer relief. We have today returned from univer-
salism to individualism. 
B. The Return to A Christian Notion of Salvation 
What did "salvation" originally mean as an offer to restore mental health? In 
forming a reply to this question, we should note that all Christians have not and 
do not agree on one precise meaning for "salvation." Yet in opposition to Becker's 
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proposal some features stand out: (1) A relation to God is required for effective 
cure versus simply the use of human procedures; (2) this involves a transcendence 
of nature. That is, we admit that the means of our salvation are not totally 
available to us at will, which is precisely the notion modem humanists fought 
against; (3) God has acted through revelation to open salvation to all who will 
accept it, but this depends on certain persons, scriptures, and the institutions 
that stand for these; (4) at least some who receive salvation find themselves 
radically transformed, returned to mental health. But this happens by a power 
which comes from outside, not from inside nature. The action that restores is 
essentially done to them, although human instruments or intermediaries may be 
involved; (5) however, all this being said, we must admit that an interest in 
religion and a tendency to mental imbalance lie close together. It is not so simple 
a matter as that everyone is restored who has contact with religion. Since the 
pursuit of religion destroys some who become involved, it is a mixed factor in 
human life. Were this not so, we would not have the intense feelings which 
arise when friends or family experience traumatic conversion to new religious 
movements. Many fear the cure all the while it is pursued. 
But when it does come, what are the therapeutic effects of salvation? How 
does it produce mental health, and do these results differ significantly from those 
obtained by secular procedures? The main factor in the religious situation, I 
believe, is that the person has come to feel burdened with guilt, however acquired, 
and this places his psychic life under a shadow. Those who still believe the 
promise of the Enlightenment fight against the religious feeling of guilt as being 
"abnormal." Release from this oppression can come but only as a result of 
forgiveness, Christianity contends. Essentially, this generous gift is thought to 
be divine in origin, but it may be administered by human agents of religion. 
The return to mental health, then, involves lifting the burden of guilt. The result 
is often reported as a return to wholeness. The one who suffers from guilt feels 
split and incapacitated because of the accumulated burden. The cleansing action 
of forgiveness releases psychic energy to function effectively, rather than digging 
one deeper into self-recrimination. The man or woman acts and feels as if he or 
she had been made new. 
It is this feeling of restoration to a lost original state that is most characteristic 
of salvation as an avenue to mental health. Popularly we call it to be "born 
again." Although it is not always rightly understood, this phrase is an accurate 
symbol for the person's restored state. Wrong actions and unsuccessful projects 
have burdened down the individual to make him or her feel old before his or 
her time. Thus, salvation is a recovery of newness and the return to a sense of 
the innocence of youth. 
Kierkegaard thought that innocence was not a virtue one should wish to recover, 
but much of Christianity differs with him on this matter, although 'innocence' 
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need not involve 'naivete.' Mental illness is the state of carrying a burden too 
heavy to bear. Salvation is the release from that incapacitating burden. Adam's 
actions banished him from the Garden of Eden. He was doomed to suffer and 
operate at a lower capacity until such time as he could recover his lost state of 
innocence. That is why salvation is spoken of as the state of becoming a child 
again. The lost Garden of Eden is restored, in the sense that one feels innocence 
recovered and no hindrances to the exercise of natural powers. Secular therapy 
explores childhood states, but its aim is to carry the patient beyond them. Salvation 
claims that it is only by return to an earlier, primitive state which all once shared 
that mental health can be restored. 
Of course, anyone who advocates following the religious life as a means to 
mental health has to admit that many who seek it never find it. Just as salvation 
lies near to destruction in the religious syndrome, many who seek it end up lost. 
Thus, a certain lack of control goes with the method of religion, versus the claim 
of psychiatry to greater accuracy with its method. One needs to assent to much 
more in Christianity than in modem psychiatry as a precondition to sharing in 
its promised health. One need not "believe in" Freud or Jung to be cured by 
their methods, or so it seems. Thus, Christianity is not a "full rationalism," 
because it assumes that reason is as much a part of the problem as it is of the 
answer. Our cure is often blocked by our belief in Becker's assertion that reason 
alone should now take control. Our confidence lies in our power to recreate 
ourselves although society often corrupts us. Rational investigation, traditional 
Christianity believes by way of contrast, can never be more than a stage of the 
initial quest. Reason as such does not move the emotions in the way they need 
to be altered, Christianity asserts. 
One difficulty which Christianity faces, in addition to its individual versus 
universal offer, is that its salvation is never full and complete at the time. The 
"restored person" is only partially or provisionally returned to new life. The 
person may enjoy his or her release as if it were a complete act. But the notion 
of Jesus' "Second Coming" is a symbol for the fact that the present era must be 
brought to a close and the whole earth transformed before individual restoration 
can be complete and final. Thus, the individual who experiences salvation and 
the gift of new life does so only by participating, in advance, in a world yet to 
be brought fully into existence. This partial or provisionary nature of all Christian 
experience of salvation can lead to disappointment or loss. A first experience of 
joy moves easily to disappointment, particularly if the individual is unable to 
sustain his hope for the future and cannot continue his religious life in anticipation 
of a final transformation. Furthermore, in Christianity this new hope must be 
shared and passed on to others by specific acts to relieve their suffering. It cannot 
be held alone. It fades fast if not transferred. 
This fragile and incomplete nature of salvation leads to the common 
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phenomenon of disillusionment or even bitterness that often develops in the 
religious novice only too soon after conversion and its experience of release. 
The new member of the religious group often expects something more complete 
and permanent than an indefinite transitional stage can offer. The joy of 
experiencing the return of mental health causes the receiver to count on more 
than has been promised. The human intermediary in this religious process may 
have made stronger or more absolute promises than the doctrine and past experi-
ence can support. Or, in their enthusiasm, disciples project greater powers of 
tran~formation onto the leader than anyone but God can provide. This explains 
the psychological necessity to claim a divine status for the "messenger of God." 
In addition, since God is at the center of all this and not a humanly contrived 
knowledge, the notorious elusiveness of Divinity makes the search for mental 
health through salvation more like a life-long pilgrimage than a permanent present 
discovery. The issue is one of whether you can find health and release in a 
situation of permanent quest. Disillusionment can set in early in both love affairs 
and religious transformation. 
As Ernest Becker illustrates, the ages of modem science and rationalism hoped 
to open a route to mental health that was universally available, one more under 
human control, one less involved in transcendence and more permanent in its 
effect. In addition to our previous discussion as to whether this project has 
succeeded, as we look over the record of psychiatry, we must also ask if the 
human psyche is of such a nature that its mental health will always be volatile 
and vulnerable. One illustration will suffice to indicate the nature of this difficulty. 
I stated above that God's involvement in the process of salvation introduces 
added complexity as well as offering help. Many representatives of religion offer 
their road to salvation as secure, final, and seemingly easy. But when the psyche 
faces God, the neatness of the offered solutions often fade away as one discovers 
how elusive and difficult God can be to deal with, due to Divinity's transcendence 
of human ways and norms. This is why "faith" is required to continue on in any 
religious group. That is, release may come, but salvation is a matter which 
knows no final solution in the present age. 
Beyond all this lies the question of whether some, if not all, human conscious-
ness demands, or is oriented to, a transcendence ofthe natural order. The modem 
age intended either to domesticate God, as Descartes did, or to place him outside 
nature, as Hume and Kant both did. This left us free to deal with the psyche as 
a natural phenomenon. But if God is an unavoidable object of search for many 
human beings, our psyche remains open to transcendence in a way that predisposes 
it to heroic quests. Becker himself suggests this, but hopes to keep it within 
natural bounds. The tendency to look beyond the natural order prevents us from 
settling down to a restricted and controllable sphere of activity. That which offers 
us new life and mental health is the same force which drives us continually 
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beyond both ourselves and nature in a life of search for the Divine. If this is the 
human situation, mental health is not easy to find or to maintain, and it can 
never be possessed with finality. But human life as an open-ended challenge can 
be exciting, once we have gotten over our natural disappointment in the failure 
of the social sciences to provide us with mental health on a universal and 
permanent basis within our control as modem scientists. Today the promises of 
religious salvation remains a possibility for every man and woman to explore, 
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